

# The Raisina Summit: Assessing the Suitability of a Presidential System for India

ARIN KUMAR SHUKLA<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>B.A. (Hons.) Political Science, University of Delhi

*“Democracy is not merely a form of Government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an attitude of respect and reverence towards our fellow men.”*

*Dr B.R. Ambedkar*

## **Abstract**

Upon the dawn of freedom in 1947, India and her people were thrust with the duty of evolving a structure of governance and administration suitable for such a vast and diverse country. Our forefathers adopted the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, the prime reason being its familiarity with the British colonial experience. Among the streams of democratic governance, the Presidential system is most prevalent apart from the Parliamentary system. This research is in pursuit of understanding various notions of democratic governance in the context of India. This research endeavours to chalk out the statutory and political distinctions between parliamentary and presidential forms of democratic government. This research commences with an introduction to the Westminster Parliamentary system and the Presidential system, while also stating the purpose of this research. The research proceeds to the historical context in which India evolved its parliamentary form of government; and how it has shaped the political history of the country. This research charts the theoretical framework – definitions and characteristics of parliamentary systems and key theoretical perspectives on governance, stability, and representation. This research utilizes comparative analysis as a yardstick to compare the two systems on the following basis – 1) Executive-Legislative relations, separation of power, and impact on policy-making and governance. 2) Political Stability. 3) Accountability and Checks and Balances. This research tries to assess the applicability of the presidential system in the socio-cultural and political context of India. Potential drawbacks and advantages will also be discussed, and the constitutional and political implications of transitioning to such a system will be examined. The conclusion will chart out the key findings of the study and will make recommendations for further policy-making and research.

## **1. Introduction - Butter or Margarine?**

During a visit to India as part of the notorious Simon Commission, Clement Atlee, Labour Member of the British Parliament and future Prime Minister of Great Britain, interacted with Indian leaders and suggested a presidential form of government for when India attained independence in due course of time. In Atlee's words, they reacted strongly in the negative – "they rejected it with great emphasis. I had the feeling that they thought I was offering them margarine instead of butter." Indians were more acquainted with the notions of Parliament and the Westminster style of democratic governance, as they had witnessed in their coloniser nation, Great Britain. Their fight was to prove and achieve equality – political and social, to that of the Englishmen, as had happened in the thirteen colonies of British America two centuries ago. Therefore, when the time came, and Indians got the right to determine their destiny by framing a constitution of their own, they laid the groundwork of the world's largest democracy in tandem with the prevailing Parliamentary form of governance.

### **1.1 The Westminster System**

The term Westminster System emerges from the Palace of Westminster which is the seat of both houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Westminster system has some consistent features of government – i) Nominal or ceremonial head of state, with or without reserve powers, as de jure constitutional holder of executive power and sovereignty ii) Members of Parliament elected from various parliamentary constituencies by various methods – First Past the Post, Proportional Representation etc iii) Prime Minister or Premier as the head of government and de facto holder of constitutional and political authority iv) Head of government is chosen by the convention of the command of a majority in Parliament and is subsequently appointed by the head of state v) No rigid demarcation of Executive and Legislative branches of government; Council of Ministers is selected from amongst the Legislature and holds collective responsibility to the same vi) Parliamentary Opposition to check the power of Government of the day in Parliament vii) Removal of government through a Motion of No-Confidence; and dissolution of Parliament viii) The executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers collectively.

### **1.2 The Presidential System**

The Parliamentary system was essentially rooted in maintaining harmony between the Monarch's sovereignty and the people's aspirations. The Presidential system, on the other hand, fundamentally originated from the defiance of the Monarchy and the Monarch's divine right to rule. Though experimented before (as Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland), it was not before the formation of the United States of America that the Presidential system was devised as we know it now. Thomas Jefferson, American philosopher, and Founding Father wrote in the Declaration of Independence –

*“A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people... these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown...”*

Features of the Presidential system are such – i) Single Executive Leadership; President as Head of State and Head of Government (Except in the case of Semi-Presidential Republics, where the role may vary) ii) Separation of Power between three branches of Government – Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary iii) Election of President either through Popular Vote (as in Mexico) or through Electoral College (as in USA) iv) President exercises executive powers vested in him; however these powers can be checked by Legislature and Judiciary v) Legislature is entrusted with law-making, however, laws can be vetoed by the President vi) Fixed Tenures; President can only be removed from office in cases of death or resignation, or through impeachment by the Legislature vii) The President is the individual executive authority and all executive authority originates from him.

## **2. India’s Tryst with Parliamentary Democracy**

*“Our difficulty is not about the ultimate future. Our difficulty is how to make the heterogenous mass that we have today take a decision in common and march on the way which leads us to unity. Our difficulty is not with regard to the ultimate, our difficulty is with regard to the beginning.”* Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar said these words as India was entering its historic phase as a parliamentary democracy. As the first blushes of independence covered the sky of India, the responsibility of electing representatives of the world’s largest democracy was thrust upon its citizens. There were a lot of reasons why democracy would not work in India – i) The state of illiteracy and poverty amongst the masses ii) post-partition trauma iii) the sheer size and scale in which elections were to be held iv) the diverse nature of the nation along the threads of religion, caste, creed, and gender. But India had just one reason for democracy to work – The trust and faith the people possessed through the virtues of their national movement and the spirit of democracy. With this spirit, India conducted its first ever general elections in 1951, and with this began the pilgrimage of a billion people towards the ideals of democracy, self-rule and stride towards the dreams that were for India, but also for the world.

Since 1951 till 2024, India has conducted eighteen general elections, electing successive governments belonging to a variety of political groups and subscribing to various political, social, and economic ideologies. The table given below represents the trend of the number of seats won and the total vote share achieved by the political party that formed the government after the conclusion of each general election. An interesting observation that can be made from the data is the fact that since independence, no political party or pre-poll alliance has successfully achieved a majority of the nationwide popular vote. Indian National Congress (INC) in 1957, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, achieved the largest share of the popular vote ever at 47.78%. This was the period when there was virtually negligible political opposition to the INC, and therefore it held sway in a majority of the seats except a few pockets where marginal regional political parties posed a challenge to it.

<i>Year</i>	<i>Political Party</i>	<i>Seats Won</i>	<i>Vote Share (%)</i>
1952	INC	364	44.99
1957	INC	371	47.78
1962	INC	361	44.72
1967	INC	283	40.78
1971	INC (R)	352	43.68
1977	JP	295	41.32
1980	INC	353	42.69
1984	INC	414	46.86
1989	JD	143	17.79
1991	INC	244	36.26
1996	JD	46	8.08
1998	BJP	182	25.59
1999	BJP	182	23.75
2004	INC	145	26.53
2009	INC	207	28.55
2014	BJP	282	31.00
2019	BJP	303	37.36
2024	BJP	240	36.56
<i>Average</i>	-	<b>264</b>	<b>34.68</b>

**Table 1: Comparison of won seats and vote share achieved by political parties that formed government after each general election**

Interestingly, the Indian National Congress secured 371 seats in the same election, which considering the contemporary strength of 505 in the Lok Sabha, amounts to about 73.4% of the whole membership of the house, a three-fourth majority. On seven occasions, the party which formed the government secured less than a third of the total popular vote in the general election.

On at least two occasions, the party that formed the government did so after winning less than twenty per cent of the popular vote. Taking an average of all eighteen general elections held to date, the parties that formed the government have won 34.68% of the popular vote, which is about one-third, and 264 seats in the Lok Sabha, 8 short of the required number for an effective majority in the house.


These trends and figures are testimonials for the coalitional nature of politics in India, and a large part of it is due to the First-Past-the-Post System adopted by India for election. For example, In the first general elections held in 1951-52, the Indian National Congress (INC) secured 44.99% of the popular vote and its candidates successfully contested across 364 constituencies. If these elections were to be held under the Proportional Representation System, with the preferences of the voters intact, INC would have ended up with just about 220 seats in Lok Sabha, falling short of majority and compelled to form a coalition government. P.A. Sangama, 11th Speaker of the Lok Sabha writes in his paper “Functioning of Parliamentary Democracy in India” – “The merit of the First-Past-the-Post System is that in our country of a billion people, we can conduct elections without complicated procedures inherent in the Proportional system of representation. The latter system also results in a multiplicity of parties in the legislative bodies.”

### **3. Comparative Analysis – An Indian Optic**

Today, the presidential style of government is the form of constitution of democracy in a great number of nations across the globe. But that does not necessarily mean that the system would be fit for a dynamic nation such as India. Therefore, it is important to compare the features of the Presidential and Parliamentary democracies through certain yardsticks, keeping in view the need for an Indian perspective.

#### **3.1 Executive-Legislative relations; Separation of Power; Impact on Policy Making**

Under the present Indian Parliamentary democracy, the principle of separation of power is employed to a lower degree in contrast to the United States, where it is the basis of the democratic government. In India, the Executive and the Legislature are intertwined cooperatively, while the Judiciary maintains an independent and nonpartisan locus. The Council of Ministers, the primary executive institution, serves per its proven majority in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Legislature, and can be removed if the House loses its confidence in it. Article 75 (3) of the Constitution of India pronounces “*The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People.*” The members of the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are also drawn from the two houses of Parliament – the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and Rajya Sabha (the Council of the States). Article 75 (5) of the Indian Constitution states “*A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of either House of Parliament shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister.*” These provisions of the Constitution testify that our forefathers had, while drafting our Constitution, envisioned a government where only elected representatives served in key portfolios or high offices.



**Fig 1: Separation of the branches of government as in the Parliamentary System (Left) and the Presidential System (Right).**

The Indian system can be contrasted with the system followed in the United States of America, where the founding fathers created the three branches of government as autonomous and competent organs. In the United States, key executive offices, such as that of the President and Vice-President, are elected directly by the popular vote through an electoral college. These officials are elected for an established tenure of four years and do not depend upon the legislative majority to continue in office. The President is not required to prove the confidence in either House of Congress – the House of Representatives and the Senate; and the Congress could remove only through a motion of impeachment. The Cabinet of the President, of which heads of various departments are members, styled as Secretaries, is never drawn from the Houses of Congress; they are however subject to confirmation by the Senate. These Secretaries are not collectively responsible to Congress and serve at the pleasure of the President.

It can be understood that the Presidential system offers an opportunity to accommodate policy experts and advisors with experience working in a specific field or background of past achievements. In the USA, often bureaucrats, army veterans, bankers, industrialists, entrepreneurs, attorneys, and major public figures, instead of career politicians, are called upon to serve in the Cabinet due to their pre-requisite value and experience. These essentially establish law-making or legislation and administration or governance as two distinct functions of government, being performed by two distinct organs – Legislature and Executive respectively. This also ensures that the Legislature decides upon matters of public interest without the anticipation of fear and favour from the ruling Executive. Also, the members of the legislature have the opportunity to interact with the people of their respective constituencies and generate their faith in democracy.

In India of the 21st century, one of the biggest challenges for us is that of ‘Brain Drain’; meaning that a majority of competent professionals migrate out of India in search of adequate opportunities. In such circumstances, it would be prudent if our government could benefit from the expertise and experience of the professionals who have worked in specific fields, such as – health, education, agriculture, or foreign affairs. In political terms too, a distinction will be established between the functions of the law-making and policy-making.

### 3.2 Political Stability

One of the inherent de-merits of the Parliamentary form of government is the unstable nature of government it produces. John P. Mackintosh, former Member of the British Parliament, who interestingly was born in Simla, British India has written in his book ‘The British Cabinet’ – “*The difference between law and convention is just that there is no formal procedure for enacting or enforcing conventions, though some conventions (e.g., the monarch shall not veto laws passed by both Houses; the Prime Minister shall resign if he is defeated on a major issues in the [House of] Commons) are as important as any laws and perhaps even more difficult to alter.*” In the United Kingdom, under the Westminster System, if the government is defeated in the House of Commons, over a major issue, the Prime Minister is expected to resign from his position by convention. The consequence has been that since 1950, the UK has held twenty-one General Elections and has had thirty different governments. As elucidated in the table below, India, another parliamentary democracy, has conducted eighteen general elections during the same duration and has had twenty-seven different governments.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Government/ Administration Formed</i>	<i>General Elections Held</i>
United Kingdom	30	21
United States of America	14	18
Republic of India	27	18

**Table 2: Number of Governments/Administrations formed and General Elections held in the United Kingdom, United States of America, and the Republic of India since 1950**

It is interesting to evaluate the position of the United States during the same period, as since 1950, the USA has held eighteen general elections like India, but at an interval of four years and not five. More interestingly, these eighteen general elections have produced only fourteen administrations or governments, which is in stark contrast to any parliamentary democracy of the USA’s standing. Presidential democracies like the USA also employ the principle of presidential succession, where the Vice-President followed by other principal executives are in line to take up the presidency in the event of a vacancy. This principle is aimed at ensuring that there is not a political vacuum at the helm of affairs and that the government functions stably.

In India, due to the parliamentarian nature of democracy, the coalitions have emerged as rules instead of exceptions. The era of the 1990s is specifically characterised as the era of coalition politics in India, as between 1989 and 1999, in a span of ten years, India held five general elections and witnessed eight different governments, none of which enjoyed a majority in the Lok Sabha and were hence unsuccessful to govern for full tenure. The Indian political system has always been on the extremes – first, it witnessed an era of One-Party dominance, as the Indian National Congress dominated the Indian polity from the attainment of independence till the 1980s. This era produced governments that enjoyed strong majorities in the Parliament and led to long continuous tenures for its Prime Ministers – Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-1964) and Indira Gandhi (1967-1977; 1980-1984).

The era of 1989-2014 played out in another extreme as no single party was successful in achieving an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha, and hence all governments formed were that of a coalition. V.P. Singh, the 8th Prime Minister of India, characterised coalition politics as “*management of contradictions*”. His government was supported from the outside by the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the left-wing Communist Parties concurrently, not for any ideological purpose but to ensure that the ruling Indian National Congress was ousted from power.

Since the rise of coalition politics, another feature that emerged in the Indian political landscape was the upsurge of defections across political parties disregarding political ideologies, the will of the constituents or even the basic sense of democracy, undermining the mandate delivered by the people. Such defections create an environment of political instability in the state and result in an upsurge in corruption, favouritism, demotivation of commercial investments, and distrust in the State’s economic machinery and capabilities. In a presidential style of democracy, political stability can be ensured in a far better manner than the incumbent parliamentary system.

### **3.3 Accountability; Checks and Balances**

Under the notion of separation of powers, the three branches of the government – Executive, Legislature and Judiciary, work in a sense that is always independent of the former and the latter. However, to ensure that no single branch of the government dominates or overrides the functioning of the others, a system of separation of powers and checks and balances has been devised. Dr Anup Chandra Kapur in his “*Principles of Political Science*” quoted German-American theorist Carl J. Friedrich on the form of true constitutional government. Friedrich proposes that a true constitutional government does not exist “*unless procedural restraints are established and effectively operating. Such restraints involve some division of power; for evidently some considerable power must be vested in those who are expected to do the restraining. Such a division of governmental power under a constitution has largely taken two forms: the functional division – such as that into legislative, executive, and judicial, and the spatial (territorial) division of federalism.*” French philosopher Montesquieu considered the exponent of the theory of separation of powers writes – “*When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body or Magistrate, there can be no liberty. Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from the Legislative and Executive power.*”

The Parliamentary form of Government, as perceived in Britain, has evolved into a system in which there is an absence of rigid separation of powers. In Britain, as the sovereignty of Parliament took shape, and the authority of the Crown diminished, the Prime Minister and its Cabinet of Ministers, holding dual membership of the Executive and Legislature, emerged as the most powerful political institution in the British Isles. English essayist Walter Bagehot has remarked, “*The Cabinet is a hyphen which joins, buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the State to the executive part of the State.*” The presidential system of government, as followed in the United States of America, has a larger degree of Checks and Balances.

#### **4. Presidential Democracy – Up to down or down to up?**

If Presidential democracy is adopted in India, it would not just be at the level of the Union government, as such a transition would impact and change the federal polity of India. The State Governments, whose style of constitution mirrors that of the Union Government, are led by the Governor as de jure nominal head of state; and Chief Minister as de facto executive authority, along with the Council of Ministers. The Chief Minister, along with his ministerial council are appointed on the convention of proven majority in the Legislative Assembly of the state. The Governor of the state, unlike the President of India, is not elected by an indirect election through the electoral college but is appointed for a fixed tenure of five years by the President on the advice of the Union Government. For all practical purposes, the Union Government selects and appoints individuals in the role of Governors, and therefore the office plays a dual responsibility of being the representative of the Union Government to the state while also continue being the constitutional head of state, in whose name the government rules. It has been seen that such an arrangement has resulted in a confrontational attitude between the Governor and Chief Minister when the ruling parties at the Centre and the State are not the same. Switching to a Presidential system would mean that the office of the Governor will practically cease to exist with its current mandate and powers, and would be replaced by the Governor who will be elected directly by the people of the state through popular vote and will serve in dual responsibility of Head of the State and Government.

In the present three tiers of government in India, it can be observed that the lowest rung of the government, which is composed of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs), and Village Councils, follows a system that is, in some sense, close to the Presidential form of governance. Urban Local Bodies like Municipal Corporations have the separate executive authority of the Mayor, who is elected directly through popular vote, while the legislative authority rests with the Assembly of Councillors, elected individually on the ward level. However, these systems are not uniform across the nation and vary from state to state as the rules are laid out. If a Presidential system is to be adopted, these basic and most absolute units of democracy will have to be accommodated accordingly with the changing dynamics of Indian polity.

#### **5. The Case for the Presidential System**

In India, there have been many academicians and politicians who have been advocating for the adoption of a presidential form of government, with Bhanu Dhamija and Shashi Tharoor being the most prominent voices among them. During the launch event of the book “Why India Needs Presidential System” by Bhanu Dhamija, Shashi Tharoor, former Union Minister and Member of Parliament, remarked “*I happen to share Mr Shanta Kumar’s view that the Parliamentary system as we practised it for the last seventy years, has demonstrated some flaws and shortcomings, and it is therefore really the time to look at an alternative.*” He further highlights how Indian freedom fighters and leaders were reluctant to adopt the idea of presidential democracy compared to the Westminster Parliamentary democracy.

He remarked *“The reason for this is of course very clear. Very much like the nationalists of the 1770s, the Indian nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s were fighting for the rights of the Englishmen. They saw that the British had ruled us for almost 200 years, and created a great deal of respect for British superiority of arms and institutions. And so, the Indian leaders tended to think that the model to aspire to is the British model. If they could rule us, maybe we would do better if we ruled ourselves the way they ruled us. And so, the Westminster became the aspiration.”*

Tharoor highlights that the adoption of the Parliamentary system in India is owed more to the British-influenced notions of the power of Parliament and the significance of the Westminster system, rather than the merits or demerits of either of it. Shashi Tharoor and Bhanu Dhamija, however, disagree on the historicity of the events, as Bhanu Dhamija argues that Jawaharlal Nehru was responsible for spearheading the cause of the Parliamentary system, whereas Shashi Tharoor argues that this was the collective will of the Constituent Assembly and not the personal argument of any individual.

## **6. Secular Approach towards Legislature and Executive**

The line between the Legislature and the Executive is blurred in the Westminster System of Government. This can be attributed to the fact that they were effectively trying to create two organs of the government – the Crown and the Parliament. The Crown was supreme and had a divine right to rule, but the Parliament was sovereign too and enjoyed a popular mandate. The English Civil War and the subsequent trial and execution of Charles I were key events in the demarcation of the authority of the monarch and the Parliament. In this constant tussle of authority, the separation of the Executive and Legislative functions of the government was not a primary concern for the Parliamentarians. It was later, in the form of the deliberations of the American Constituent Assembly, that the need to secularise these two noble functions of government was discussed and decided upon. American nationalists were afraid of the concentration of power, as they witnessed as subjects of the British Crown. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison wrote about the need for separation of power in the Federalist Papers – *“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently, should be so constituted...”*

In India, when a voter exercises his right to vote, he effectively is deciding upon two questions put forth to him – A) Who would represent your constituency best in the legislature? B) Who do you find best suited to form the government? Voters elect MPs and MLAs and they in turn form the government, providing scope for deviation of popular mandate by the elected representatives. Also, among these elected representatives are elected the head and members of government, which leaves a low degree of legislative function for them. The argument that takes shape is why should the voter answer two questions with a single vote. A secular approach towards the separation of Legislature and Executive would mean that the voters can put in two votes – one to decide who should represent their electoral constituency, and the second to decide who should form and run the government. These norms would be not just for the Union but also for the constituent States – providing a federal polity that distributes power not just vertically, but horizontally too.

## **7. Key Findings and Recommendations**

The following are the key findings of the research:

- The framers of the Constitution envisioned the Republic of India as a Parliamentary form of democracy due to its sheer size and magnitude of diversity; but also due to the influence and imprint the colonial rule left to them.
- The coalitional nature of electoral politics in India has resulted in the instability of the government at all levels.
- A presidential form of government can offer a more stable and responsible form of government, as compared to the parliamentary system.
- The presidential system as followed in the United States of America can be observed as a model of institutionalism, but cannot be mirrored in the Indian context.
- If instituted, any Presidential form of Government in India will be required to assimilate the history of its communal statute and the experiences of its Parliamentary past, along with the needs of the impending future, to devise the best executive and legislative practices.
- Rigid separation of the Legislature and the Executive as institutions secular to each other, may result in a more responsive democracy and institutional set-up.
- In order to establish true federal polity, horizontal, in addition to the vertical distribution of power and responsibility would have to be initiated.

## **8. Conclusion - Majestic March of the Elephant**

S. Narendra in his book 'India's Tipping Point' presents an interesting insider anecdote of the Indian government during the era of the 90s. Narendra served as the Principal Information Officer in P.V. Narasimha Rao's PMO and spearheaded the PR campaign for the 1991 economic reforms. There was a debate back then among policymakers about picking up a mascot for the advertisements attracting foreign direct investment in India. The tiger comes as a natural choice being the national animal of India, but the term 'Tiger Economies' was already in use in the context of the emerging Southeast Asian economies. At last, the good old Elephant was chosen as the mascot, despite several apprehensions and objections. It was explained that the gradual march of the Elephant is always majestic and sure-footed. This is how the Indian economy will prosper, majestically and assuredly.

The elephant as a symbol has been used by various people to support various narratives like Narendra did with the economy. But the mighty elephant can also be very well used as a symbol of India's majestic stride towards true democracy. Our actions have been very sure-footed, promising the best to those with faith in the Constitution, and even to those who do not. Also, our forge ahead has had a peculiar element of majesty and charm, originating from a popular non-violent struggle for independence. A possible transition to a presidential democracy from the parliamentary form could mean the effective realisation of this journey we have endured. Popular and political support for the same needs to be tested and seen.

## References

1. Tharoor, S. (2023, September 18). *Crafting a new chapter in parliamentary conduct*. The Hindu. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/crafting-a-new-chapter-in-parliamentaryconduct/article67319134.ece>
2. Mansfield, H.C. (2024, September 06). *Presidential Immunity From Plato to Trump*. The Wall Street Journal. <https://presidentssystem.org/2024/09/09/u-s-president-is-a-strong-executive-but-no-king/>
3. Madhav, R. (2023, September 09). *Constitution is not a rigid document*. The Indian Express. <https://presidentssystem.org/2023/10/22/constitution-is-not-a-rigid-document-ram-madhav/>
4. Dhamija, B. (2015, October 15). *Why India Needs The Presidential System*. Harper Collins.
5. Dhamija. B. (2020, August 12). *Why a Presidential System makes sense*. The Indian Express. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/why-a-presidential-system-makes-sense-6551935/>
6. Luxemburg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History. (1946, March 15). *Address given by Clement Attlee to the House of Commons*. Hamsard No. 420. [https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/1c712462-349f-43199b3bfadf8e198aad/publishable\\_en.pdf](https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/1c712462-349f-43199b3bfadf8e198aad/publishable_en.pdf)
7. Tharoor, S. (2007, December 16). *It's time to rethink the parliamentary system*. The Times of India. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/shashi-tharoor/shashi-on-sunday/its-time-to-rethink-parliamentary-system/articleshow/2625159.cms>
8. Dhamija. B. (2020, November 04). *Why India should switch to a US-like Presidential System*. [Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/976252/why-india-should-switch-to-a-us-like-presidential-system](https://scroll.in/article/976252/why-india-should-switch-to-a-us-like-presidential-system)
9. ATTLEE, Clement. [*Indian Policy. Memorandum by the Prime Minister*]. [en ligne]. Londres: Great Britain. Cabinet Office. 22-05-1947. C.P.(47)158. Consulté le 07-12-2024. Disponible à l'adresse <https://www.cvce.eu/s/c3>.

10. Puig, G. V. (2002). *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. AQ: Australian Quarterly, 74(5), 9–40. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20638116>
11. Belliappa, C. M. (1967). *What Kind of Democracy in India? Case for the Presidential System*. Economic and Political Weekly, 2(36), 1649–1652. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24477964>
12. Sen, S. R. (1993). *India's Political System: What Is to Be Done?* Economic and Political Weekly, 28(1/2), 27–34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4399275>
13. *Presidential Prime Minister*. (1985). Economic and Political Weekly, 20(42), 1759–1760. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4374923>
14. PATHAK, D. N. (1958). *IS PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT SUITABLE TO INDIA?* The Indian Journal of Political Science, 19(4), 335–342. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42753634>
15. OZAKINCI, T. (2023). *The Impact of the Transformation from Parliamentary System to Presidential System on the Budgetary Process in Türkiye*. Journal of Civilisational Studies, 8(1), 1-17. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/3154235>
16. Toygür, I. and Kirişçi, K. (2019). *Turkey's new presidential system and a changing west*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turkeys-new-presidential-system-and-a-changing-west/>
17. Bisariya, S. (2023). *Transitions to Parliamentary System: Lessons Learned From Practice* - Discussion Paper. International IDEA. <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/2023-11/transitions-to-parliamentary-systems-lessons-learned-from-practice.pdf>
18. Thakur, R. (2020, September 26). *In Parliament's Defence: Parliamentary democracy usually trumps the presidential form of it*. The Times of India. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/in-parliaments-defence-parliamentary-democracy-usually-trumps-the-presidential-form-of-it/>
19. Continental Congress. (1776, July 4). *Declaration of Independence: A Transcription*. National Archives. <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript>
20. Bose, S. (2024, May 13). *The crisis of India's Parliamentary Democracy*. Down To Earth. <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/governance/the-crisis-of-india-s-parliamentary-democracy-96105>

20. IGNOU. (?). *Parliamentary Democracy in India*. E-Gyankosh. <https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/70383/1/Block-2.pdf>
21. Viswanathan, T. K. (2012). *The Indian Parliament*. Lok Sabha Secretariat. [https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/68/1/The Indian Parliament Eng.pdf](https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/68/1/The%20Indian%20Parliament%20Eng.pdf)
22. Shankar, B. L. and Rodrigues, V. (2011). *Introduction: India's Parliamentary Democracy and its Critic*. Oxford Academic. <https://academic.oup.com/book/33072/chapter-abstract/281791320redirectedFrom=fulltext>
23. Sangama, P. A. (?). *Functioning of Parliamentary Democracy in India*. VIF India. <https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/Functioning%20of%20Parliamentary%20Democracy%20in%20India.pdf>
24. DH Web Desk. (2024, April 12). What is a parliamentary democracy and how it differs from other types of democracy. Deccan Herald. [https://www.deccanherald.com/elections/india/explained-what-is-a-parliamentary-democracy-and-how-it-differs-from-other-types-of-democracy-2975718#google\\_vignette](https://www.deccanherald.com/elections/india/explained-what-is-a-parliamentary-democracy-and-how-it-differs-from-other-types-of-democracy-2975718#google_vignette)
25. Kapur, D. and Mehta, P. B. (2006). *The Indian Parliament as an Institution of Accountability*. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. <https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/bio/uploads/The%20Indian%20Parliament.pdf>
26. Singh, T. B. (1996). *Principle of Separation of Powers and Concentration of Authority*. JTRI Journal. Issue 4 & 5. <https://ijtr.nic.in/articles/art35.pdf>
27. National Assembly of France. (1789). *Declaration of the Rights of Man*. Yale Law School. [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th\\_century/rightsof.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp)
28. Mackintosh, J.P. (1977). *The British Cabinet*. Stevens & Sons.